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1. Introduction
It is often held that educational expansion narrows social inequalities within nations by 
promoting a meritocratic basis for status attainment, yet substantial research indicates 
that  the relative  advantages  of  elite   children   over  children  with  less  privileged 
background have changed little in the last decades (Hannum and Buchmann, 2003; 
Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993; Breen and Jonsson, 2000); on average higher status children 
perform better in school and attain higher educational levels. In this light, equality of 
opportunity (EOP) in education is still a highly relevant issue in the international 
educational policy agenda. 
Class differentials in educational attainment are related in the sociological literature 
to primary and secondary effects (Boudon, 1974). The former refer to the influence of 
social origin on ability early in children’s educational careers: high status parents are 
more likely to sustain and motivate the school work and provide a stimulating 
environment to their offspring. The latter operate through the choices that families make 
within the educational system (including exit) given the level of ability. The rational 
action approach (Goldthorpe, 1996; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), assuming that 
families wish to avoid  intergenerational downward mobility, provides a theoretical 
explanation for the evidence that, at given levels of ability, school choices vary across 
social   background.   Ability   is   intended   here   as   an   observed   measure   of   school 
performance (typically grade point average) as opposed to unobserved measures of 
cognitive abilities, since it is held that it is the former that affects the decision process 
through the perceived probability of schooling success. 
The evaluation of primary and secondary effects is particularly relevant at the end of 
compulsory schooling, where in many countries students face the decision whether to 
enrol into the academic track
1 (which gives access to tertiary education), to enrol into a 
vocational track, or to enter the labour market. 
EOP obviously depends on institutional features and can be affected by educational 
policies.   Interventions   aimed   at   enhancing   the   performance   of   children   of   less 
advantaged background are likely to help containing primary effects. Secondary effects 
can be reduced by endorsing the enrolment of lower status children into the academic 
track or, possibly, by regulating access through ability assessments. 
The evaluation of the relative importance of primary and secondary effects is the aim 
1 The term tracks is often used in the literature to indicate the different secondary school educational 
paths available to students in a certain educational system. The academic track is the one conceived to 
prepare for university studies (even if in some countries it is not strictly necessary to enter tertiary 
education).of a growing body of literature (Erikson et al, 2005; Jackson et al., 2007; Stocké, 2007; 
Kloosterman et al., 2007). This research – based on surveys carried out at a national 
level – provides empirical evidence of the relevance of secondary effects in the creation 
of class differential in educational attainment.  The methodology, briefly sketched in 
Section 2, combines the estimates of the distribution of school performance and of the 
probability of choosing a specific track given school performance, at each level of 
social background. A counterfactual argument is carried out: for each  j  and  h,  the 
probability of entering the academic track that individuals would face if they had the 
ability distribution of class j, but the transition probability given ability of class h, is 
evaluated. Observed and counterfactual odds-ratio are compared, and a decomposition 
based on counterfactuals provides an estimate of the relative importance of primary and 
secondary effects. 
Aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of primary and secondary effects in 
secondary school choices in Italy. Other countries studies (UK, Sweden, Germany, 
Netherlands) are based on panel surveys recording data on children’s schooling careers, 
but prospective longitudinal data is not available for Italy. The analysis is based on the 
data of the survey Percorsi di studio e di lavoro dei diplomati (ISTAT, 2004), which 
collects detailed information of individuals educational histories up to three years after 
the secondary school degree. A major issue to deal with is self-selection (see Section 4), 
as only secondary school graduates are interviewed
2. By integrating the survey data with 
administrative and census information we derive estimates of the relevant distributions, 
correcting for selection bias.
As lower secondary school final marks are assigned on a 4-level scale (satisfactory, 
good, very good, excellent
3), a semi-parametric version of the standard approach is 
adopted. Results are described in Section 5. The main conclusion is that secondary 
effects are more important in shaping social origin differentials in secondary schools 
decisions than primary effects. By comparing our estimates with those reported in the 
recent literature, it turns out that the relative contribution of primary effects is 
substantially weaker in Italy than in the other countries.     
2. The methodology
Let A be a continuous measure of students' school performance before track choice and 
S a discrete variable representing social status. Then  ( ) S A f |  is the distribution of the 
performance scores for each social group; assuming a normal distribution, the relevant 
parameters can be estimated by group sample mean and variance. 
Define Y as a binary variable taking value 1 if the academic track is chosen and 0 
otherwise (i.e. if the student chooses a different track or if he does not enter secondary 
education). Note that Y refers to the first choice after the end of compulsory schooling 
and not to possible subsequent changes. The transition probability given performance 
( ) S A Y P , | 1 =  can be estimated with binary logistic regression for each class separately. 
2 Employing data from PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment; OECD, 2005) in this 
context would greatly weaken the sample selection problem, since students are interviewed at 15, i.e. 
near the beginning of secondary school. However this option proves impossible since PISA does not 
include information on students' performance before track choice. PISA may however be appropriate to 
evaluate the total effect of social background on track choice (see for example Contini and Scagni, 
2008).




f A∣S= j P Y=1∣A ,S= j dA (1)
evaluated for each  S  by numerical integration, represent the predicted probability
( ) j S Y P = = | 1    whose observed counterpart is the percentage of those belonging to 
social class j enrolling into academic schools.  




f A∣S=j P Y=1∣A,S=kdA (2)
is a “counterfactual” probability. Expression (2) is the probability that an individual 
would experience if he had the performance distribution of social class  j  and the 
transition probability of class k. With K social classes, there are K(K-1) counterfactual 
probabilities. 
The total effect of class j over class k on the propensity to continue to the academic 
track is represented by the odds ratio: 
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The numerator represents the odds of continuing to academic education for an 
individual exposed to the performance distribution and the transition probability of class 
j, while the denominator represents the odds for an individual with performance 
distribution of class k and transition probability of class j. Since the difference here lies 
only in the performance distributions, this quantity is informative on primary effects. 
Similarly:
( )
( ) kk kk
kj kj









provides information on secondary effects, as what varies here is the transition 
probability while the performance distribution remains fixed. 
The total effect (3) can be factorized in two distinct ways:
kk kj kj jj kk jj Q Q Q . . . =
jk jj kk jk kk jj Q Q Q . . . =
By taking the logarithms, we obtain:
kk kj kj jj kk jj L L L . . . + = (4a)jk jj kk jk kk jj L L L . . . + = (4b)
where in each case the first term on the right hand side refers to situations with different 
performance distribution but the same transition probability, and the second term to 
situations with the same performance distributions and different transition probability. 
The relative importance of secondary effects can be evaluated by   kk jj kk kj L L . . /   or 
kk jj jk jj L L . . / . Estimates based on (4a) and (4b) generally differ, although in practice not 
to a great extent (see Erikson et al, 2005 for details).  
Assuming that there are only two social levels to ease the understanding: H (high) 
and L (low), we obtain the following expressions: 
LL LH LH HH LL HH L L L . . . + =
where the log total effect is given by the primary effect evaluated with the transition 
probability of the high class and the secondary effect with the performance distribution 
of the low class; 
HL HH LL HL LL HH L L L . . . + =
where the first term is the primary effect evaluated with the transition probability of the 
low class and the second term is the secondary effect with the performance distribution 
of the high class. 
It   is   worthwhile   to   note   that   under   the   linear   probability   model: 
P Y=1∣A,S =μλSθA , with  A=αβSε , the following would hold:
P Y=1∣S=j1−P Y=1∣S= j=βθλ
In this case primary effects are represented by bq and secondary effects by l. Instead, it 
can be shown that under the logistic model (even in the absence of interaction effects 





primary and secondary effects – as measured by means of (4a) and (4b) – are functions 
of the parameters of both the model for A and the model for S, although the component 
related to primary effects is much more sensitive to b and q , and the component related 
to secondary effects is much more sensitive to l.
3. The analysis for Italy 
3.1 Institutional features 
Although compulsory education starts at age 6 and ends at age 16, the last two years are 
a very recent formal requirement; for the cohort considered in this work (students born 
in 1982) the end was still set at 14. There are five years of primary school and three 
years of comprehensive lower secondary education, after which students choose their 
upper secondary school among many different programmes. As in most European countries, in spite of the wide range of different secondary 
school types, a broad distinction between an academic and a technical/professional track 
can be made. The academic track lasts five years and includes different types of lyceum: 
classical,  scientific,  linguistic,  artistic
4. The technical and vocational tracks (lasting 
respectively five and three years) lead directly to a professional qualification. 
There are no special admission requirements, such as ability tests or marks, to enter 
the different tracks. After five years of schooling (with two integrative years for 
vocational schools), all tracks give access to university (Eurydice, 2006b). In practice, 
only few students from the vocational track enter tertiary education: in the ISTAT 
sample little more than 20% did, while the proportion for lyceums was higher than 90% 
and about 50% for technical schools.
3.2 The data
Differently from other countries, no adequate panel survey recording schooling careers 
is available for Italy. Given this limitation, we employ cross-sectional data from the 
survey Percorsi di studio e di lavoro dei diplomati carried out by ISTAT on higher 
secondary   school  graduates,  recording   the   relevant   longitudinal   information 
retrospectively. The survey takes place every three years since 1998, and graduates are 
interviewed three years after the degree attainment, with the aim to investigate the 
transition from secondary school to tertiary education or work. As we will point out in 
Section 4, the nature of the survey implies the existence of significant sample selection, 
which will have to be dealt with.  
 The survey on 2001 graduates (ISTAT, 2004) has been employed in this paper. The 
data has been collected with a two stage sampling scheme, on 1868 schools and 20408 
individuals
5. Essential to our analysis is the recording of the final student's mark at the 
end of lower secondary school, the subsequent track choice, and a set of variables 
describing parental occupational and educational status
6.
3.3 Final marks in lower secondary school 
According to the rational choice theory (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), families make 
their educational choices with the aim to avoid downward mobility, according to future 
employment prospects and the probability of schooling success of their children relative 
to each option. This assessment is made by taking into account children's ability, 
conceived as an observed measure of school performance as opposed to unobserved 
measures of cognitive abilities. 
In Italy, the final lower secondary school mark
7 is the main observed information on 
4 At the time of track choice for the ISTAT sample, the Istituto magistrale prepared for the primary 
school teaching career.  Although this type of school has been later redefined as  socio-pedagogic 
lyceum, and further university education is now required to enter the teaching profession, until a few 
years ago this school gave direct access to it. For this reason we will not consider this school type as 
belonging to the academic track. 
5 Interviews were carried out with CATI. Initial sample size was set to 29.000 units; telephone numbers 
were wrong or there was no reply in about 25% of the cases, and 4% ended up with refusals.
6 Although we do not employ this classification in the present paper, the data allow to define individuals 
with respect to three social classes as in the simplified British  National Statistics Socio-Economic 
Classification, used for example in Jackson et al. (2007).
7 The mark is attributed after a national exam, detached from normal school activity, held at the and of children's   ability   before   track   choice.   We   highlight   three   possible   sources   of 
measurement error:
(i)  Final lower secondary grades encompass in Italy only four distinct proficiency 
levels  (excellent, very good, good, satisfactory).  This  highly discrete grading 
system appears to be quite a rough measurement of students' ability when 
compared with other countries marks, based on finer scales (e.g. ten levels in the 
British case). 
(ii)  Exams are set up by the school teachers, and are not based on standardised national 
tests
8. An indirect evidence of the existence of a bias is that, although international 
assessments such as PISA (OECD, 2005) show a significantly lower average level 
in Southern Italy with respect to the North, in the South the percentage of 
excellent is higher than in the rest of the country. 
(iii) Related to point (ii), if marks were given with some reference to the average ability 
within   the  school,   higher  performing  schools  could   evaluate  their  students 
somewhat more severely. The issue is  particularly relevant  in highly socially 
segregated environments, since on average high status children perform better. 
The problem of measurement error is not explicitly addressed here. The reason is 
twofold. First, we think that the main source of bias in the Italian case is likely to be 
given by sample selection, due to employing data on secondary school graduates. 
Perhaps more importantly, the second reason has to do with the rationale of the 
analysis. If it is true that people make their educational choices on the basis of observed 
school performance
9, the “correct” measure of ability for secondary effects is given by 
marks, even if they are affected by measurement error. On the other hand, the “correct” 
measure for identifying class differentials in the performance distribution should be 
latent ability. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the decomposition method described above 
involves investigating the role of manifest ability in shaping school choices. In fact, 
social class transition probabilities - see formula (1) - are a weighted average of the 
class transition probabilities given ability (marks), where weights are given by the 
relative proportion of individuals with each level of ability (again, marks) within the 
class. In this light it is not relevant whether the school mark is a measurement error 
version of true ability (measurement error is instead very relevant for the assessment of 
inequality of opportunity in the true ability distribution across social classes). Thus, 
when we come to interpret primary effects in this context, we should acknowledge that 
what is here called “primary effects” has to do with the distribution of latent ability and 
the way this ability is actually translated in marks
10.               
Yet, this caveats would not hold if people were aware of their true level of ability and 
shaped their decisions accordingly: transitions rates would have to be assessed given 
true ability and weights defined consequently. If marks were employed in this case, the 
relative contribution of primary effects would be underestimated
11.
lower secondary school (Esami di Stato conclusivi del I ciclo).
8 This issue is likely to become less relevant in the future:  from 2007, in fact, final exams include two 
standardized tests (linguistics and mathematics) with common evaluation guidelines.
9 Stocké (2007) addresses this issue for Germany and finds that educational choices are driven mainly by 
school marks, although a minor effect can be ascribed to parents' perception of their children ability.      
10 It is nevertheless obvious that in the extreme case where marks were hardly related to ability, the 
decomposition itself would loose much if its meaning, in that secondary effects would become the only 
source of class differentials.
11 With the aim to investigate this issue we have developed a simulation study (not presented here). The 4. Sample selection
As we have pointed out, no adequate panel survey recording school careers is available 
for Italy, and for this reason we employ the ISTAT cross-sectional survey on graduates 
2001, recording the relevant information retrospectively.  Since the survey target 
population does not include those who have enrolled into a secondary school and exited 
the educational system before graduation
12, the sample is affected by selection bias. 
We now deal with the consequences of sample selection on the estimates of the 
relevant distributions for primary and secondary effects. We will show that without 
corrections, we would  underestimate  both the differences in the ability distribution 
across social background levels, and the effect of social background on school choices. 
Note that traditional methods for dealing with sample selection (e.g. Heckman's 
method) cannot be employed in this context because micro-data on dropouts is not 
available.
Primary effects
As before let A be the school performance before track choice and S a measure of 
families social status. Define G as a binary variable taking value 1 if the child has 
attained a secondary school degree and 0 if he has dropped-out of the educational 
system. The distribution of interest is P(A|S), while the observable distribution is P(A|S, 






∫A PG=1∣S , APA∣SdA
The observable distribution and the distribution of interest coincide if the second 
factor in the right hand side is equal to 1, i.e. if performance A does not affect the 
graduation probability given social status. Since this is obviously very unlikely, the 
survey estimate of the performance distribution given social status is biased. 
Let us recall that in the Italian system ability is measured on a 4-level ordinal scale, 
which we will code as: satisfactory (1), good (2), very good (3), excellent (4). We will 
make the assumption that school drop-outs come exclusively from the population of low 
performers (see next section for empirical evidence on this):
PG=0∣S ,A= j={
f S 0 if j=1
0 if j=2,3,4
(5)
For  j=2,..,4 this implies that:
0
) | 0 (
) | ( ) , | 0 (





S j A P S j A G P
G S j A P (6)
Since:
) | 0 ( ) 0 , | ( ) | 1 ( ) 1 , | ( ) | ( S G P G S A P S G P G S A P S A P = = + = = = (7)
bias appear to be little for measurement error of type (i) and (ii), somewhat bigger  but not dramatic for 
type (iii).  
12 Children who have chosen a vocational program and attained a “qualifica professionale” (after three 
years) but not a “diploma” (after five years) are also excluded from the survey. To simplify the 
exposition, we will refer to the term “dropouts” to indicate them too.by combining (6) and (7) we obtain:
PA= j∣S= {




P A= j∣S  if j=1
(8)
In order to estimate P(A|S), we employ the ISTAT graduates' survey to assess P(A|S, 
G=1), but we also need to estimate the graduation probability given social status 
P(G=1|S). Since: 
) (
) 1 ( ) 1 | (
) | 1 (
S P




we will estimate P(S|G=1) from the graduates survey and exploit the official statistics 
derived from administrative data sources for the overall graduation probability P(G) and 
the social status distribution P(S) (see Section 5.2).  
Secondary effects
Let Y represent again secondary school choice: Y=1 for the academic track and 0 
otherwise. We are interested in P(Y=1|A,S), but we can only estimate P(Y=1|A,S,G=1). 
Since:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) S A G P
S A Y G P
S A Y P G S A Y P
, |
, , |






= = = = (10)
the survey estimate is unbiased if,  given ability and social status,  the graduation 
probability does not depend on the chosen track. Note that Y refers to the first choice 
undertaken at the end of compulsory school, while graduation can be achieved in any 
track. Students may change track if they fail or if they are not satisfied with their initial 
choice, and then graduate. In this light, the likelihood to attain a secondary school 
degree will not depend on  how difficult or selective the specific track is. The enrolment 
into the academic track will be considered instead as a signal of higher aspirations.      
The   consequences   of   employing   directly   the   graduates'   survey   to   estimate 
( ) S A Y P , | 1 =  can be easily grasped by assuming the simple linear probability models: 
P G=1∣A,S ,Y =αβAγSδY
P Y=1∣A,S =λξAθS
We obtain:
( ) ) , | 0 ( ) 0 , , | 1 ( ) , | 1 ( ) 1 , , | 1 ( , | 1 S A Y P Y S A G P S A Y P Y S A G P S A G P = = = + = = = = =
=αβAγSδPY=1∣A ,SαβAγSPY=0∣A,S
=αβAγSδPY=1∣A,S




This expression is never smaller than 1 (it is equal to 1 if d=0), and is a decreasing 
function of  A  and  S. In fact,   λξAθS 1  (since it is a probability); given that 
parameters are positive, it is an increasing function of A and S. Thus, the observed 
probability is greater than the probability of interest for all status, but it is increased by a 
greater factor for the lower social background. As a consequence, secondary effects are 
underestimated. As we will show in the next section, by employing a different data 
source, empirical evidence suggests however that d should be nearly 0, meaning that 
aspirations   are   entirely   captured   by  school   performance  and   social   status.   No 
corrections are needed in this case; P(Y=1|A,S) is estimated directly from the graduate's 
survey data. 
4.1 Supporting the assumptions
We now turn to data analyses carried out in order to provide empirical support to the 
assumptions described in the previous section. 
P   rimary effects    
Let us recall the relevant assumption, described by equation (5), stating that, for each 
social background, only low performers eventually drop-out from school. The marginal 
distribution of  performance can be written as:
) 0 ( ) 0 | ( ) 1 ( ) 1 | ( ) ( = = = + = = = = = G P G j A P G P G j A P j A P
from which we obtain the performance distribution for school-drop-outs:
) 0 (
) 1 ( ) 1 | ( ) (
) 0 | (
=
= = = - =
= = =
G P
G P G j A P j A P
G j A P                            (11)
This distribution can be roughly estimated by employing the graduates survey data – 
providing information on  ( ) 1 | = G A P  – and aggregate administrative data from ISTAT 
– which records the overall distribution of lower secondary final examination marks 
( ) A P  for the year 1996, as well as an estimate of the overall national percentage of 
school dropouts  PG=0  for the same year. Applying (11) we obtain:
( ) 96 , 0 0 | 1 ˆ = = = G A P        ( ) 05 , 0 0 | 2 ˆ = = = G A P
( ) 005 , 0 0 | 3 ˆ = = = G A P     ( ) 02 , 0 0 | 4 ˆ - = = = G A P
13. 
strongly supporting the assumption.
S   econdary effects    
We now evaluate the assumption:
13 Small inconsistencies among the combined data sources produce a negative probability, which is 








S A G P
S A Y G P
 (12)
i.e., that the effect of aspirations is entirely captured by that of school performance and 
social status. 
As we have pointed out before, no longitudinal micro-data on schooling careers is 
available for the estimation of the conditional distribution of G. However, a survey 
carried out jointly by CISEM and IARD
14 in 2006 on 3600 upper secondary school 
students in the area of Milan can be employed for this purpose. The sample includes 
students in each of the five grades of the upper secondary schools; information on 
school careers as well as family characteristics, including parental educational and 
occupational status are recorded. The survey is cross-sectional and does not include 
dropouts; nevertheless, by comparing 1° grade students (including all future dropouts) 
with 5° grade students (assuming that nobody exits the school system thereafter), we 
can roughly assess the dropouts profile. 





P Y=1∣G=1, A,S 
PY=1∣A,S 
The right hand-side can be estimated by the ratio of the proportion of the academic track 
students in 5° grade and that for 1° graders. Considering  S  as the highest parental 
education and modelling both   PY=1∣G=1,A,S   and   PY=1∣A,S   with binary 
logit regressions, these ratios are all close to 1
16, supporting the validity of (12).
5. The empirical analysis
5.1 Semi-parametric approach
In Section 2 school performance A was taken as a continuous variable – as in most 
countries marks follow a fine scale and in some cases the grade point average is 
employed –  which can be approximated quite well by a normal distribution; although 
not strictly necessary, this is also useful for the numerical evaluation of integral (1). 
Because of the highly discrete scale (see Section 3.3), the normal distribution is 
clearly not appropriate for Italy. In this context, let A be the discrete variabile taking 







14 CISEM stands for Centro per l’Innovazione e Sperimentazione Educativa Milano and is a research 
centre on educational problems of Provincia di Milano. IARD - Istituto Franco Brambilla is a research 
centre focusing on life problems and opportunities of young people. The authors would like to thank 
both CISEM and IARD for the collaboration and availability of data.







16 These ratios vary from 0.93 for high status-high ability students to 1.32 for low-status-low ability 





The performance distribution P(A|S) is estimated non-parametrically, given gender 
and geographical area (North West, North East, Center, South and Isles); although the 
transition probability  PY=1∣A,S  could be estimated non-parametrically as well, to 
privilege parsimony and keep results simple we employ binary logit models as in the 
original approach. 
Note that although in the relevant literature  social class - derived from parental 
occupation (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) - is generally considered, for the moment 
we operationalize S with reference to the highest parental educational attainment. The 
main reason is that, having to correct for sample selection by employing national 
aggregate statistics on official reports, there seems to be stronger coherence between the 
two data sources
17. In what follows, the terms indicating social origins will always refer 
to this concept.
5.2 Sample selection correction factors
As we have seen in Section 4, in order to correct for sample selection, for the evaluation 
of  PA∣S  we need to estimate  PG=1∣S=PS∣G=1PG=1/PS . The three 
factors in the right hand side have been obtained separately for males and females and 
for each geographical area as follows:
● PS∣G=1  has been estimated directly from the graduates survey data;
● PG=1  is the marginal graduation probability for the cohort under study; it has 
been computed as the ratio of the number of graduates in 2001 (data directly 
obtained from the Education Ministry Statistical Office) to the number of births in 
1982 (data from ISTAT Annuario di Statistiche Demografiche official publications).
● P(S) is the national distribution of the highest parental educational level for the 1982 
birth cohort (the 19 years old in 2001), derived from ISTAT Annuario di Statistiche 
Demografiche (which reports the joint parental educational level at child birth).
The first estimates of  PG=1∣S  were not always strictly smaller than one and mild 
inconsistencies in their ordering were found
18. This could be due to the fact that we 
employ different data sources, which are likely to be affected by non-sampling error in 
various ways
19. Another potential source of bias is that the data employed for the 
estimation of P(S) refers to parental educational level at child birth, and does not record 
the educational qualifications attained afterwards; to be consistent with the definition of 
status in the survey the distribution at age 14 should be employed. 
Since these first estimates varied little among geographical areas and inconsistencies 
were found to be weaker on aggregate data, the distributions were evaluated at a 
17 Note also that for Italy the odds ratio between Y and S when status is measured by social class is much 
lower than that relative to the highest parental educational level. Moreover, some recent works seem to 
be going in the same direction (see e.g. Kloosterman et al., 2007).
18 Students from upper level families appeared in few cases to be slightly more likely to to drop out than 
those from middle level families.
19 Sampling variability should enter here only via  PS∣G=1 , but the standard errors of the estimates 
from the graduates survey are very small, and cannot alone explain the inconsistencies. national   level.  Furthermore,   to   take  into   account   the   slight  bias   towards   lower 
educational levels due to employing parental education at child birth, small adjustments 
to the estimates of  PG=1∣S  were applied
20. 
The final estimates are reported in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Estimated probabilities  PG=1∣S  of attaining the upper secondary school 
diploma by parental educational level and gender
Parental education tertiary upper secondary lower sec./primary
males 0.87 0.85 0.52
females 1.00 0.99 0.60
 
5.3 Results
Following the approach outlined in Section 4.1, primary and secondary contributions to 
































Ljj.kk  =  Ljk.kk  +  Ljj.jk
Ljj.kk  =  Ljj.kj    +  Lkj.kk
Lij.hk=lnPij/1−Pij−lnPhk/1−Phk
Figure 1. Scheme of the applied decomposition technique
20 We assume somewhat arbitrarily that 5% of those with upper secondary qualification obtain a 
university degree after their child birth and that 7% of those with compulsory education obtain a high 
school diploma. With these reasonably sized values all probability estimates did not exceed 1. Note that 
decompositions (4a) and (4b) are only slightly affected by mild changes in these percentages.   PA∣S  – conditional on highest parental educational level, but also on gender and 
geographical area – is estimated from the graduates survey and corrected for sample 
selection as in (8) and (9). Results are reported in Table 2. The distribution is much 
more favourable for children from well educated families. Moreover we observe that 
females are better performers than males, in line with the evidence from all over the 
world, and that more positive marks are observed in the South and Isles
21.
Table 2. Lower secondary school final mark distribution P(A|S) after sample selection 
correction, by highest parental educational level, gender and area
Male Female
Parental 
education Lower sec. school final mark Parental 
education Lower sec. school final mark
North-
West
satisfactory good very 
good  excellent satisfactory good very 
good  excellent
tertiary 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.26 tertiary 0.12 0.23 0.22 0.43
upper sec. 0.38 0.29 0.17 0.16 upper sec. 0.17 0.29 0.29 0.25
lower sec./prim. 0.68 0.17 0.10 0.05 lower sec./prim. 0.56 0.23 0.13 0.08
North-
East
tertiary 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.18 tertiary 0.06 0.25 0.29 0.40
upper sec. 0.42 0.28 0.19 0.11 upper sec. 0.17 0.33 0.27 0.23
lower sec./prim. 0.71 0.16 0.08 0.05 lower sec./prim. 0.58 0.22 0.12 0.08
Centre
tertiary 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.28 tertiary 0.10 0.17 0.28 0.45
upper sec. 0.40 0.28 0.18 0.14 upper sec. 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.28
lower sec./prim. 0.72 0.16 0.06 0.06 lower sec./prim. 0.58 0.21 0.12 0.09
South 
Isles
tertiary 0.25 0.17 0.23 0.35 tertiary 0.06 0.17 0.23 0.54
upper sec. 0.39 0.26 0.18 0.17 upper sec. 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.37
lower sec./prim. 0.68 0.18 0.08 0.06 lower sec./prim. 0.53 0.20 0.13 0.14
Table 3. Raw transition rates to the academic track P(Y=1|A,S) by highest parental 
educational level, lower secondary school final marks, gender and area
Male Female
Parental 
education Lower sec. school final mark Parental 
education Lower sec. school final mark
North-
West
satisfactory good very 
good  excellent satisfactory good very 
good  excellent
tertiary 0.37 0.61 0.80 0.90 tertiary 0.29 0.61 0.82 0.84
upper sec. 0.13 0.30 0.47 0.77 upper sec. 0.07 0.25 0.50 0.67
lower sec./prim. 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.46 lower sec./prim. 0.03 0.12 0.28 0.48
North-
East
tertiary 0.31 0.58 0.78 0.96 tertiary 0.21 0.61 0.72 0.91
upper sec. 0.08 0.20 0.43 0.73 upper sec. 0.08 0.24 0.43 0.64
lower sec./prim. 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.59 lower sec./prim. 0.03 0.10 0.21 0.56
Centre
tertiary 0.51 0.68 0.84 0.92 tertiary 0.32 0.55 0.83 0.93
upper sec. 0.10 0.26 0.51 0.72 upper sec. 0.15 0.26 0.53 0.74
lower sec./prim. 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.45 lower sec./prim. 0.06 0.21 0.34 0.50
South 
Isles
tertiary 0.36 0.68 0.69 0.86 tertiary 0.23 0.42 0.68 0.85
upper sec. 0.10 0.21 0.39 0.63 upper sec. 0.13 0.22 0.50 0.68
lower sec./prim. 0.02 0.08 0.28 0.47 lower sec./prim. 0.09 0.13 0.28 0.51
21 As noted in Section 3, there is evidence of some measurement error across the country, as this result is 
not in line with the standardised resulted by the international assessment PISA.  Table 3 shows the raw observed transition rates to the academic track for all sub-
groups. As expected, the propensity to enrol into a liceo is much higher among better 
performing students and for those from higher status.
As anticipated in Section 4.1, in order to compute counterfactual probabilities and 
the ensuing decomposition into primary and secondary effects,   PY=1∣A,S   was 
modelled with binary logit regression on A, gender and area - separately for each value 
of S. Preliminary log-linear analysis showed no significant interactions among these 
regressors, so only main effects of the three covariates were included in the model. 
Since the parameter estimates for the distinct  A  levels are remarkably close to a 
progression with unit steps for all three educational levels, models where A was taken as 
a   quantitative   covariate   (taking   values   1-4   from  satisfactory  to  excellent)  were 
preferred. The results are shown in Table 4.
At the same level of demonstrated ability the transition probability is much higher 
among high status children
22. The effect of ability is approximately the same among the 
different parental background. Gender differences are less marked;  the variable  is 
significant for lower and upper S: females with low educated parents are more likely 
than males to enter the academic track given ability, while transition probabilities are 
higher for males from families with tertiary education. Geographical effects are not very 
clear. 
Table 4. Logit models for the transition probabilities to academic track
S = tertiary S = upper secondary S = lower sec./primary
Full model b Sig. Exp(b) b Sig. Exp(b) b Sig. Exp(b)
ind_North-West 0.286 0.014 1.33 0.208 0.001 1.23 -0.147 0.101 0.86
ind_North-East 0.252 0.053 1.29 -0.034 0.646 0.97 -0.196 0.055 0.82
ind_Center 0.594 0 1.81 0.256 0.000 1.29 0.126 0.162 1.14
gender (female) -0.290 0 0.75 0.069 0.168 1.07 0.385 0 1.47
ind_buono 1.030 0 2.8 0.955 0 2.6 1.050 0 2.86
ind_distinto 1.827 0 6.22 1.976 0 7.22 2.032 0 7.63
ind_ottimo 2.765 0 15.88 2.895 0 18.09 3.088 0 21.94
constant -0.778 0 -2.242 0 -3.314 0
Simplified model b Sig. Exp(b) b Sig. Exp(b) b Sig. Exp(b)
ind_North-West 0.289 0.013 1.34 0.210 0 1.23 -0.149 0.097 0.86
ind_North-East 0.259 0.046 1.3 -0.031 0.669 0.97 -0.197 0.053 0.82
ind_Center 0.595 0 1.81 0.257 0 1.29 0.125 0.164 1.13
gender (female) -0.287 0 0.75 0.069 0.169 1.07 0.385 0 1.47
A 0.899 0 2.46 0.971 0 2.64 1.023 0 2.78
constant -1.614 0 -3.213 0 -4.327 0
No geographic area b Sig. Exp(b) b Sig. Exp(b) b Sig. Exp(b)
gender (female) -0.288 0 0.75 0.072 0.15 1.07 0.382 0 1.47
A 0.871 0 2.39 0.965 0 2.62 1.026 0 2.79
constant -1.315 0 -3.098 0 -4.365 0
22 This can be seen from the raw probabilities in Table 3 and is reflected in the values of the constant in 
the logit models in Table 4. Factual and counterfactual probabilities Pii  and Pij estimated as in (13) and (14) are 
reported in Table 5
23. Rows refer to school mark distributions according to parental 
education, while columns indicate which level of  S  is used to model the transition 
probability to the academic track. Thus, the numbers located on  the diagonal are the 
actual estimated transition probabilities  Pjj= PY=1∣S= j   for each family status. 
These values are higher for females; stronger gender differences are observed for low S: 
females with low parental education are almost twice as likely to enrol into a liceo  than 
males.
Off diagonal elements Pjk are instead counterfactuals, combining lower secondary 
school marks distribution and conditional transition probabilities for different parental 
educational levels. For example, P11=0.677 is the transition rate of a male whose parents 
have tertiary education. The transition probability of an hypothetical child with the 
ability distribution of the upper class but the conditional propensity to choose liceo of 
the lower class is given by P13= 0.206; similarly, the transition probability when the 
ability distribution is that of the lowest class and the conditional propensity is that of the 
upper class is P31= 0.489. 
Table 5. Estimates of Pij for Italy
Male Female
P(Y=1|S;A) referring to... P(Y=1|S;A) referring to...
P(A|S) referring to... tertiary upper sec. lower sec. /primary tertiary upper sec. lower sec. /primary
tertiary 0.677 0.382 0.206 0.726 0.506 0.353
upper secondary 0.597 0.290 0.142 0.644 0.411 0.272
lower sec. /primary 0.489 0.190 0.082 0.480 0.251 0.149
There is a noticeable tendency - somewhat stronger for males - to decline faster 
along rows than along columns, indicating that the differences in family preferences for 
Y=1 due to S given children's marks are more relevant in determining the track choice 
with respect to school performance differences due to S.
Table 6 presents the results of the decomposition into primary and secondary effects. 
Both formulas (4a) and (4b) are computed, and produce similar results; average 
contributions are also reported.  The main finding is that  secondary  effects  tend to 
prevail in all contexts, the sole  exception being that of medium vs. low status females. 
It is important to recognise that this result does not imply that class differentials in 
children's ability are weak (see the discussion on measurement error in Section 3), nor 
that differentials due to S in children's school marks are weak. Results imply instead that 
differentials due to S in secondary school choices are mainly driven by differences in 
the transition probabilities given previous school performance, while differences in the 
performance   distributions   play   a   weaker   role.   This   may   occur   either   because 
performance distributions vary little across social status, or because performance does 
not affect much school choices
24. Distinguishing between these two alternatives is 
23 Since the estimates resulting from the simplified models without the dummies for area do not change 
much with respect to the ones coming from the extended model, the more parsimonious  specification 
was employed
24 In principle, there could be wide family status differences in the observed level of ability, but if school 
choices are affected little by performance, depending mainly on social status, these differences would 
not exert a relevant role.possible by looking directly at the estimates of  PA∣S   and  PY=1∣A,S .
By comparing the estimates between males and females and across social origins, we 
can see that the relative importance of secondary effects is stronger for males than for 
females, and is stronger when comparing upper and middle status with respect to middle 
and low status. With respect to gender, by looking at Table 2 we find no clear 
differences in the social status effect on the performance distribution
25. Furthermore, 
from Table 4
26 we derive that the social origin effect on the probability to choose the 
academic track given ability is milder for females than for males. Given that the effect 
of ability is very similar across values of S, we may conclude that the gender difference 
in the  relative  contributions of primary and secondary effects is due to weaker 
secondary effects for girls (in absolute terms) rather than to stronger primary effects.     
























Ljj.kk 1.634 3.156 1.522 1.333 2.720 1.387
Ljk.kk 0.347 0.782 0.556 0.381 1.054 0.736
Ljj.jk 1.287 2.374 0.966 0.952 1.666 0.652
% primary 0.212 0.248 0.365 0.286 0.387 0.530
% secondary 0.788 0.752 0.635 0.714 0.613 0.470
Ljj.kj 0.416 1.068 0.621 0.384 1.140 0.761
Lkj.kk 1.218 2.089 0.901 0.949 1.581 0.626
% primary 0.255 0.338 0.408 0.288 0.419 0.549
% secondary 0.745 0.662 0.592 0.712 0.581 0.451
average % 
primary 0.234 0.293 0.387 0.287 0.403 0.539
average % 
secondary 0.766 0.707 0.613 0.713 0.597 0.461
6. Conclusions 
The results described in Section 5.3 are particularly interesting when considered within 
the international context. The most striking finding is that the relative contribution of 
primary effects is much lower in Italy than in the other countries for which the analysis 
has been carried out. Let us review the main results. Primary effects
27 account for about 
76% of the total social background effect in UK (Jackson et al., 2007, for year 2001), 
58% in Stockholm, Sweden (Erikson, 2007, for 1990), 47% in the German Lander 
Rhineland (Stocké, 2007, for 2003), 58% in the Netherlands (Koosterman et al., 2007, 
for 1999). The corresponding estimates for Italy are much lower: 29.3% for males and 
25 Moreover, by estimating, somewhat improperly, a linear model for performance, we do not find 
significant interaction effects between gender and status, (i.e. the effect of status on performance does 
not change with gender).  
26 See the constant and the gender coefficient. 
27 The percentage with respect to the high-low status comparison is reported here.40.3% for females. Although these values are not fully comparable, because of cross-
country institutional differences, definitions of social status
28  and because ability 
assessments are not always standardized, differences are however large, and it would be 
of great interest to understand the reasons laying behind them. 
We can think of different topics for further work: 
(i)   In order to interpret the results from a comparative point of view, the absolute 
contributions of primary and secondary effects should be evaluated together 
with the relative ones. This implies recovering comparable estimates of the total 
effect of social origins on school choices. Note however that cross-country 
comparisons  are even more  problematic  in this  case: employing  parental 
education  or  social  class  can   give rise  to  substantials   differences   within 
countries
29. 
(ii) The low importance of primary effects in Italy with respect to other countries can 
have two alternative interpretations:  a) social background differentials in the 
school performance distributions are relatively weak; b) the  role of ability in 
educational   decisions   is   weak.   Given   the   difficulties   in   cross-country 
comparisons based on national data, evidence from the international assessment 
carried out on 4
th  graders, PIRLS (Progress in International Reading and 
Literacy Study; Mullis et al., 2003) can help to shed some light on this issue. 
Simple regression analysis indicate for example that Italy is one of the countries 
with the lower inequality of opportunity with respect to performance scores near 
the end of primary school.
(iii)The assessment of how specific institutional features – in particular, early 
tracking – affect equality of opportunity in education is the  focus of an 
interesting body of  work (Hanushek and Woessman, 2006; Woessman, 2007; 
Brunello and Checchi, 2007): by employing international surveys like PISA, the 
school design effect is identified by exploiting the cross-country variability. To 
our knowledge no attempt has been done yet to deepen the understanding of how 
institutional features promote or discourage primary and secondary effects
30. In 
order to put forward educational policies with the aim to reduce educational 
inequality it would be very useful to try opening the black box and separate the 
effects on school performance from those on choices given performance. At the 
moment this aim is difficult to accomplish, as on one hand it is difficult to 
harmonise national data to allow for adequate cross-national comparisons, on the 
other hand international data such as PISA cannot be employed for this purpose, 
because no measure of ability before school choice is available. This could be an 
interesting challenge for future research.
28 In UK and Sweden father's social class, in Germany mother's social class, in the Netherlands and Italy 
the highest parental educational level. 
29 We can see this from PISA, for which common alternative definitions are possible. Taking the highest 
parental educational level the following raw OR between high and low social status are found: 
Netherlands 4.7, Italy 6.9, Germany 12.9. Taking social class, Netherlands 8.5, Italy 5.8, Germany 8.4. 
30 For example, why is it that in Italy primary effects are so low? Could it be due to the fact that the 
compulsory school system is quite highly standardised in Italy? (standardization refers to the degree to 
which the quality of education meets the same standards nationwide; Allmendinger, 1989). On the other 
hand, secondary effects are strong. Is this related to the absence of performed-based restrictions to the 
academic track, at work in other countries (Netherlands for example)?      References
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